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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

JOHN RICHARD KOCHER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981513-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of
Exercising Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311
(1993)1; one count of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998); and one count of Interference With a
Peace Officer Making an Arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995).

Jurisdiction is

conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1996) whereby the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over appeals from the district court for a conviction in a
criminal case other than for a first degree or capital felony.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The following pertinent statutes are reproduced in full and
attached as Addendum A:

1

This section has been amended and renumbered as Utah Code
Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1998) , with the amendment being effective May 5,
1997. However, the current version of the statute is identical in
pertinent part to the statute as it read in April, 1997.

Utah
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993);
401, Utah Rules of Evidence;
4 02, Utah Rules of Evidence;
4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence;
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS

1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a

conviction of unauthorized control over a motor vehicle
("joyriding") when the owner of the vehicle did not testify that
the vehicle had been taken without her permission?
Standard of Review.

A jury conviction will be reversed when

the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted."
1983).

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah

In applying this standard, this Court "review[s] the

evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury."
Preservation of the Argument.

Id.

At trial, defense counsel

made a motion for a directed verdict to dismiss the theft charge
on the basis that the state had failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish one of the necessary elements of that
crime.

(R. 108:309-10)2; see Addendum B.

Specifically, the

motion was based on a lack of evidence sufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Tamara Troester had not given

2

The entire transcript of the trial is contained in one
volume marked "R. 108." Appellant refers to that record cite, with
the internal page numbers listed after "R. 108:."
2

Mr. Kocher permission to use the vehicle.
2.

(R. 108:310).

Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying

Appellant's motion for mistrial after the state's witness
improperly testified regarding inadmissible other crimes
evidence?
Standard of Review.

Appellate courts reverse a trial

court's denial of a motion for mistrial where the trial judge
abused his or her discretion.

See State v. Kiriluk, 969 P.2d

1054, 1060 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,
1230 (Utah 1997).
Preservation of the Argument.

This issue was preserved at

R. 108:167-68, 193-202; see Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated July 30, 1997, the state charged
Defendant/Appellant John Richard Kocher ("Appellant" or
("Mr. Kocher") with Count I: Theft of a Motor Vehicle, a second
degree felony; Count II: Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted
Person, a third degree felony; Count III: Possession of
Methamphetamine, a third degree felony; and Count IV,
Interference with a Peace Officer Making an Arrest, a class B
misdemeanor.

R. 3-6.

Pursuant to Appellant's motion, the trial

judge severed the weapon possession charge from the other
charges.

R. 32, 108:9.

Prior to trial, Appellant also filed a

motion in limine, requesting "the state be precluded from
introducing evidence of prior bad acts as prohibited by the Utah
Rules of Evidence 404(b)."

R. 33.
3

At the start of the trial,

the trial judge heard argument on that motion and issued a
ruling.

R. 108:7-9.

A jury trial was held on April 29 and 30, 1998.

R. 108.

During the course of the trial, Appellant made a motion for
mistrial.

R. 108:193-200.

The trial judge denied the motion.

R. 108:200.
After both sides rested, Mr. Kocher made a motion to dismiss
the theft of a motor vehicle charge.

R. 108:309-10.

The motion

was unsuccessful, and the jury convicted Kocher of the lesser
included offense of joyriding, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993), possession of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1998); and interference with a
police officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995).

R. 108:322-23.

On July 23, 1998, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Kocher to
prison.

R. 89-90.

See Addendum D containing judgment.

Mr. Kocher filed a timely notice of appeal on August 18, 1999.
R. 98.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Although the Information alleged in support of Count I that
Mr. Kocher "obtained or exercised unauthorized control over
the . . . vehicle of Tamara Troester" (R. 3 ) , Ms. Troester did
not testify.
first witness.

Instead, the state called Kenneth Troester as its
R. 108:122.

Mr. Troester testified that he and Tamara were the owners of
4

the 1995 Monte Carlo involved in this case.

R. 108:123.

He did

not have any documentation which indicated his joint ownership of
the car.

R. 108:124.

Ms. Troester was the person who ordinarily drove the car.
R. 108:124.

She was using the car on April 12, 1997, the date of

the incident in this case.

R. 108:123.

Although Mr. Troester did not ordinarily drive the car and
was not driving the car on April 12, 1997, he testified that he
did not give Mr. Kocher permission to drive the car.

R. 108:123.

Mr. Troester acknowledged that it would be possible for
Ms. Troester to give someone permission to drive the car without
informing him.

R. 108:124.

He also indicated that Ms. Troester

told him that she had left the car running with the keys in it,
and Mr. Troester concluded that the car had been stolen.
R. 108:125.
On April 12, 1997, Cari Lee Reeves was parked with the
driver's door of her car next to a green car, in the parking lot
of a Circle K located at 4699 South 4800 West, Salt Lake County.
R. 108:128, 132.

She testified that a man walked between the two

cars, coming from behind the cars.
was going to go into the store.

R. 108:129.

R. 108:129.

She thought he

Instead, the man

turned around, looked into the car next to her, walked around,
got in the car, and drove away.

R. 108:129.

The man seemed agitated, as if he were in a hurry.
R. 108:130.

The tires squealed as the car backed out.

R. 108:135.
5

Ms. Reeves thought the car had been stolen because the man
did not come out of Circle K, and "there was a lady standing in
there and I guess she had just noticed that her car was gone."
R. 108:130, 131.

Ms. Reeves did not identify the "lady" as

Tamara Troester or otherwise describe her.

R. 108:127-39.

Ms. Reeves identified the man who drove away in the green
car as Appellant.

R. 108:132.

She had also selected him from a

photo array, but had difficulty making that selection.
R. 108:135, 143.
Officer Daniel Delao responded to a call at the Circle K.
R. 108:147.

He talked to Ms. Troester, then put out an attempt

to locate on the vehicle.

R. 108:148.

The officer then spoke

with the cellular phone company which provided service for the
cell phone in the vehicle.

R. 108:148.

He learned that the cell

phone in the vehicle had repeatedly dialed a specific phone
number during the past few minutes.

R. 108:150.

The officer obtained the address for the phone number which
had been dialed.

R. 108:150.

He went to that address, 1879

South 300 East in Salt Lake City.

R. 108:151.

At the address, Officer Delao saw the car in the driveway,
then saw a man he identified as Mr. Kocher start to get into the
car.

R. 108:152-53.

Delao and another officer blocked the

driveway with their cars.
himself as an officer.

R. 108:154.

R. 108:156.

Delao then identified

The man stepped out of the

vehicle, said something like "Don't shoot," then began backing
up.

R. 108:157.
6

According to Delao, as the man backed up, he lowered his
hands to his waistband and moved around the car.

R. 108:158.

The other officer removed his canister of pepper spray, but
dropped the canister as he started to deploy it.
that point, the man began to run.

R. 108:159.

grabbed him as he started to climb a fence.

R. 108:159.

At

The officer

R. 108:159.

The officer and Mr. Kocher ended up facing each other.
R. 108:160.

Delao testified that Mr. Kocher hit him in the

stomach and a scuffle ensued.

R. 108:160.

Delao indicated that

Mr. Kocher7s behavior was consistent with someone who was under
the influence of some type of drug.

R. 108:178.

During the scuffle, Delao saw a gun which he pulled from
Appellant's waistband.

R. 108:161.

Delao struck Mr. Kocher

several times with his baton to subdue him.

R. 108:164.

During

a search of Mr. Kocher after taking him into custody, the officer
found a pager, a hypodermic needle and a white-yellowish rocklike substance which a crime lab employee later identified as
methamphetamine.

R. 108:170, 184.

ended in the number "911."

The pager had six calls which

R. 108:182.

Officer Delao also testified that during the search of
Appellant, he found two books of stolen checks.

R. 108:167.

Appellant objected and the trial judge ordered that the testimony
about the "stolen" checks be stricken and instructed the jury to
disregard any reference to the checks.

R. 108:168.

reserved a motion for mistrial, which he later made.
193.
7

Appellant
R. 108:169,

Stacy Nelson, Mr. Kocher's girlfriend, testified for the
defense.

R. 108:205-223.

At the time of this incident,

Ms. Nelson was receiving threats from Terry Lewis, who was
associated with the Sundowners.

R. 108:206.

Apparently,

Mr. Lewis met Stacy as part of the "meth circle" and he had gone
after her because of previous confrontations he had with Stacy's
father.

R. 108:207, 208.3

Stacy had been kidnapped and beaten

about a month before the incident in this case.

R. 108:209, 220.

She thought she had also been raped, but could not remember
because she was drugged.

R. 108:223, 231-32.

On the day of this incident, Ms. Nelson received more
threats from Terry Lewis.

R. 108:209, 210.

One of those threats

was about being taken to a clubhouse, which meant being beaten
and raped.

R. 108:215.

Stacy, who was at a house at about 1800

South and 3 00 East, paged Mr. Kocher several times, using numbers
ending in 911 as a code.

R. 108:210.

"Stacy to John, it's an emergency."

The numbers signified

R. 108:211.

She did not

call the police that day because she did not think they would
help her because she was a methamphetamine addict.

R. 108:214.

Stacy had been up for a couple days and was very scared by the
threats.

R. 108:217, 219.

Mr. Kocher arrived at the 1800 South house and was frantic
because he thought Stacy might already have been taken.

3

Although Ms. Nelson was in treatment when she testified,
she had previously been addicted to methamphetamine. R. 108:2 07.
Methamphetamine is a stimulant which increases anxiety, impairs
judgment and causes paranoia. R. 108:191-192.
8

R. 108:217.

Stacy asked about the car and he told her he got it

a Circle K.

R. 108:217.

She told him he needed to return it and

Mr. Kocher told her that he planned to.

R. 108:217.

Appellant also testified that Stacy was being threatened by
Terry Lewis, and had paged him with the emergency messages.
R. 108:234.

Mr. Kocher had been staying awake at night,

protecting Stacy, and it had been several days since he slept.
R. 108:235.
On the day of the incident, Mr. Kocher left to try to get a
job, while Stacy went to the house of her friend Tiffany.
R. 108:236.

While at a friend's house working on a car,

Mr. Kocher ingested methamphetamine.

R. 108:24 0.

received emergency pages from Ms. Nelson.

He also

R. 108:23 6.

Mr. Kocher ran out of the house believing, in his altered state,
that he could run to Tiffany's house and save Stacy.

R. 108:23 6.

When Mr. Kocher got to the Circle K, he saw the car running
and "figured it would be okay for me to borrow it to go over to
the house to make sure [Stacy] was all right."

R. 108:237.

got in the car and headed for Tiffany's house.

R. 108:23 7.

He

Mr. Kocher tried to call the owner of the vehicle using the cell
phone.

R. 108:237.

He kept getting a busy signal because he was

calling the cell phone number and did not realize it due to his
intoxicated state.

R. 108:237.

After he arrived at Tiffany's

house, Stacy yelled at him "for having somebody else's car," and
he "figured the only way to get ahold (sic) of the lady was to
get some kind of number or address off the registration . . . of
9

the vehicle."

R. 108:238.

Minutes after Mr. Kocher arrived, the police arrived.
R. 108:218-219.

He was frightened by the guns to his head, and

scared that he was going to get shot.

R. 108:23 8.

He originally

thought it was some of Mr. Lewis' friends, and then tried to
avoid being shot or beaten.

R. 108:238-239.

Mr. Kocher acknowledged that he imagined he had possession
of methamphetamine.

R. 108:24 0.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

To support a conviction for joyriding, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Mr. Kocher exercised
unauthorized control over the vehicle of another; (2) such
control was without the owner's permission; and (3) Mr. Kocher
had the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession of
the vehicle.
The prosecution failed to prove that Mr. Kocher's use of the
vehicle was without the permission of the owner, Tamara Troester.
The testimony of Kenneth Troester that he did not give such
permission does not prove whether Tamara Troester gave her
permission for Mr. Kocher to use the vehicle.

Nor does the other

circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Tamara Troester did not give Mr. Kocher
permission to use the vehicle.
The trial judge abused his discretion in denying Appellant's
motion for mistrial.

The judge had ordered in limine that

evidence of other bad acts was not admissible.
10

This ruling was

correct since the state did not present a witness who established
that the checkbooks were "stolen" and the evidence was irrelevant
and highly prejudicial.
The prosecutor did not inform the state's witness that
testimony regarding "stolen" checkbooks found in Appellant's
possession was improper.

The officer improperly testified that

Appellant had stolen checkbooks in his possession when arrested.
This inadmissible other crimes evidence prejudiced Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PROSECUTION DID NOT BEAR ITS BURDEN OF
PROVING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT TAMARA TROESTER
DID NOT GIVE HER PERMISSION FOR MR. KOCHER TO USE THE
VEHICLE.
A conviction must be reversed when the evidence "is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
Petree, 659 P.2d at 444.

Constitutional Due Process requires the

prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of a
criminal offense with which a defendant has been charged.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977); State v. Cox,
751 P.2d 1152 (Utah App. 1988).
Mr. Kocher was convicted of joyriding in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1993), an offense which consists of three
elements that must be proven by the prosecution: "(1) exercising
'unauthorized control over' someone else's vehicle, (2) without
the owner's permission, and (3) 'with intent to temporarily
deprive the owner . . .

of possession of the motor vehicle.'"
11

State v. Carruth, 947 P.2d 690, 693 n.8 (Utah App. 1997)
(omission in original) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311
(1995)) .
Instruction No. 20 set forth these elements.

R. 67.

Instruction No. 20 required the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. That on April 12, 1997 in Salt Lake County
Utah the defendant, JOHN RICHARD KOCHER
2. exercised unauthorized control over a motor
vehicle not his own, without the consent of the owner
or law custodian and
3. that he had the intent to temporarily deprive
the owner or lawful custodian of possession of the
motor vehicle.
R. 67. 4

By failing to present testimony of Tamara Troester, the

owner and custodian of the car, as to whether the car was taken
"without the owner's permission," the state failed to establish
its burden.

See Carruth, 947 P.2d at 6 93 n.8.

4

While reading the instructions to the jury, the trial judge
improperly sua sponte changed instruction number 18 (R. 64) , the
elements instruction for theft of a motor vehicle. He indicated
that instruction number 18 required a finding that Appellant
"obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the vehicle of
Tamara Troester [or Ken Troester]."
R. 64, 108:277-78.
The
written instruction discussed with the parties required the jury to
find that Appellant exercised unauthorized control over the vehicle
of Tamara Troester, and did not include Ken Troester as an
alternative owner. R. 64. Appellant objected to the change and to
the judge's sua sponte action in inserting Ken Troester as an
alternative owner. R. 108:310. The jury acquitted Appellant of
that offense.
Instruction number 20, the elements instruction for joyriding,
required the jury to find that Appellant took the car without the
consent of the owner or lawful custodian.
R. 67. Even if Ken
Troester were a co-owner, this instruction required a finding that
none of the co-owners consented, i.e. a finding that Tamara
Troester did not consent.
12

The marshaled evidence in support of the jury's finding as
to this element is as follows:
1.

Kenneth Troester's testimony that he did not

authorize Mr. Kocher's use of the vehicle (R. 108:123);
2.

Cari Lee Reeves' testimony that she thought the car

was stolen because Mr. Kocher did not come out of the
Circle K, and an unidentified "lady was standing in there
and I guess she had just noticed that her car was gone"
(R. 108:130, 131);
3.

Stacy Nelson's testimony that Mr. Kocher told him

he got the car at the Circle K and that she told him to
return it (R. 108:217);
4.

Testimony that Officer Delao responded to call at

the Circle K and spoke to "the victim Ms. Troester"
(R. 108:147-48);
5.

Evidence of Mr. Kocher's actions when the officers

approached him in the driveway (R. 108:157); and
6.

Mr. Kocher's testimony that he saw the vehicle

running and "figured it would be okay for me to borrow it to
go over to the house to make sure [Stacy] was all right"
(R. 108:237).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this
evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Kocher exercised unauthorized control over a motor vehicle
not his own.
The Information alleged that Mr. Kocher exercised
13

unauthorized control over the vehicle of Tamara Troester.

R. 4.

Although Kenneth Troester testified that he also owned the car,
he acknowledged that the car was primarily Tamara's to drive and
that she had control over it on April 12, 1997.

R. 108:123-24.

Additionally, he acknowledged that she could have given someone
permission to drive without telling him.

R. 108:123-24.

Mr. Troester's testimony that he did not authorize Kenneth to
drive the car fails to establish that Ms. Troester did not
consent.
Mr. Troester's additional testimony that the car was stolen
and that he had been told Tamara left the car running in the
parking lot likewise fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that Tamara did not consent.

The statement that the car was

stolen was a conclusion that the jury needed to make.

The

statement about the car being left running was hearsay, something
about which Mr. Troester had no personal knowledge, and failed to
establish that Tamara had not given Mr. Kocher permission to
drive the car.

See Rules 801, 802 and 602, Utah Rules of

Evidence.
Cari Lee Reeves' statement that an unidentified lady
appeared to have noticed that her car was missing and Ms. Reeves'
own belief that the car had been stolen likewise do not establish
that Tamara did not consent.

The testimony fails to establish

that Tamara Troester was the "lady" and does not establish that
the owner of the green car did not give permission for it to be
driven.
14

Stacy Nelson's testimony that Mr. Kocher told her he got the
car at the Circle K and that she told him to return it also does
not establish that Mr. Kocher took the car without the owner's
consent.

That exchange could have occurred regardless of whether

Mr. Kocher was given permission to take the car.
The fact that Officer Delao arrived at the Circle K in
response to a call and spoke with "the victim, Ms. Troester"
before putting out an attempt to locate on the car also does not
establish lack of consent.

Police are frequently called to

investigate situations in which it turns out that no crime has
been committed.

Additionally, officers put out attempts to

locate in situations that do not result in charges.

Indeed,

introduction of a police report by the state, even if it outlines
all elements of a crime, is not acceptable.
664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) .

See State v. Bertul,

Instead, the state is required to put

on a live witness even though the witness has previously told the
officers that a crime occurred, in order to establish that a
crime actually occurred.
Moreover, any statements from Tamara Troester to the officer
were unreliable and inadmissible hearsay.

See Lee v. Illinois,

476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986)(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62
n.4 (1980)); Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.

The state is

required to put on a live witness even if the witness had
previously told the officer a crime occurred.
Officer Delao's testimony regarding Mr. Kocher's behavior
when the officers approached likewise does not establish that
15

Mr. Kocher intentionally took the car without permission.
Appellant's behavior could have been consistent with innocence on
the theft charge, or based on possession of a weapon, or the
result of ingesting methamphetamine.

See State v. Bales, 675

P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983) (recognizing that flight evidence can be
"contradictory as to its motive," fully consistent with
innocence, and/or evidence of guilt of something other than the
crime charged); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 791 (Utah
1991)("evidence of flight or concealment of a crime does not
support an inference of intentional conduct on the part of the
accused").

Mr. Kocher7s behavior when officers approached him

could have been completely unrelated to the theft of a motor
vehicle charge.
Mr. Kocher testified that he saw the vehicle running and
"figured it would be okay for me to borrow it to go over to the
house to make sure [Stacy] was all right."
testified that he planned to return it.

R. 108:237.

Id.

He also

The state could

have asked Mr. Kocher whether he had permission to take the car,
but did not.

R. 108:234-44.

Mr. Kocher's testimony as it stands

fails to establish that Mr. Kocher intentionally took the vehicle
without Ms. Troester's consent.

The state needed the testimony

of Ms. Troester to establish this element.

Without that

testimony, it failed to sustain its burden of establishing that
Appellant committed the crime of joyriding.
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine
16

requesting "the state be precluded from introducing evidence of
prior bad acts as prohibited by the Utah Rules of Evidence
404(b)."

R. 33.

At the start of the trial, the parties briefly

argued this motion.

R. 108:7-8.

The judge granted the motion

"with the exception to the testimony regarding items missing from
the vehicle," but allowed the defense to renew the motion as to
those items later.

R. 108:8-9.

The motion was apparently later

renewed at the bench, and as acknowledged by the prosecutor and
judge, the judge ordered that the state not mention the stolen
checkbooks.

R. 108:193, 198, 200.

The prosecutor neglected to inform the officer that he was
not to refer to stolen checks.

R. 108:195, 198.

When the

prosecutor questioned Officer Delao, the officer referred to
stolen checks, in violation of the pretrial order.

R. 108:167.

The following exchange occurred:
Prosecutor:

What did you locate [when searching
Appellant]?

Officer:

In the pants pocket of the suspect there
were a few things; there was a hypodermic
needle--actually not in his pocket, but
the hypodermic needle was next to him.
The--according to my report here,
there's--there's two books of stolen
checks and a yellowish--

R. 108:167 (emphasis added); see Addendum C containing transcript
of testimony relevant to this issue.
objected.

R. 108:167.

Defense counsel immediately

The trial judge ordered that "the

statement referenced by this officer to any checks that may have
been stolen" be stricken.

R. 108:167.

jury as follows:
17

He then instructed the

Members of the jury panel, that is not charged nor
relevant nor material in this case, and one of the
functions that I have is to insure that the--as the
evidence gets past me to you, that it is both, is
legally relevant and not prejudicial.
Sometimes extrinsic things get said that really aren't
germane or pertinent to the charges before you and-and reference to these other materials doesn't — isn't
legally relevant with respect to the charges before us
today, so I'm going to ask you to disregard any
reference, utterance made by this or any other witness
to matters that are not legally pertinent, specifically
the last statement made by this officer regarding some
checks which were--may or may not have been found and
may or may not have been stolen or whatever, that has
no bearing whatsoever in this case and you're just to
disregard that utterance in its entirety and I'll order
it stricken. Okay?
R. 108:167-68.
Appellant moved for a mistrial.

R. 108:193; see Addendum C.

Since the judge had previously ruled that the evidence was
inadmissible, the argument revolved around the prejudice caused
by this testimony.

R. 108:193-200.

The trial judge denied the motion.

R. 108:200.

He found

that the error was inadvertent, and offered to give the jury an
additional curative instruction.

R. 108:201.

Appellant declined

the additional instruction, pointing out that calling even more
attention to the information would compound the problem.
R. 108:202.
As a preliminary matter, the trial judge correctly issued an
order in limine precluding the state from introducing evidence
that Appellant had stolen checkbooks in his possession when
arrested.

Possession of stolen checkbooks by Appellant was not

relevant and therefore was inadmissible since it did not have
18

"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
402, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rules 401 and

Additionally, the testimony was not

admissible under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence since it was
evidence of another bad act to show that Appellant acted in
conformity therewith, and did not fall into any of the Rule
404(b) categories for admissibility.

Moreover, admission of the

evidence violated Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence since the
prejudicial effect substantially outweighed the nonexistent
probative value.

This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have

repeatedly recognized "the inherent and unavoidable inflammatory
potential" of other crimes evidence and the "dangers to the
fairness and integrity of a trial" caused by such evidence.
State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 490 (Utah 1997) .5

See

In this case,

where the evidence had little or no probative value, the
prejudicial effect of conveying information of this other bad act
to the jury outweighed any probative value.
Additionally, no foundation evidence was presented as to who
owned the checkbooks and any testimony by the officer that they
5

The Utah Supreme Court amended Rule 4 04(b), effective
February 11, 1998. A Committee Note attached to that amendment
indicates that the amendment is intended "to return to the
traditional application of Rule 404 prior to Doporto."
The
prejudice caused by other crimes evidence was well acknowledged in
Utah case law prior to Doporto. See e.g. State v. Saunders, 699
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) (evidence of prior crimes is presumed
prejudicial); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295
(Utah
1988) (other crimes evidence "tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy
of the factfinding process"); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424
(Utah 1989).
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were stolen was hearsay, admitted in violation of Rule 801, Utah
Rules of Evidence.

Apparently, the state intended to use Tamara

Troester to testify that various items were stolen from her car.
R. 108:194.

When Ms. Troester did not testify, the jury was

"left to speculate . . . as to whether it was her checks, the car
owner's checks, or somebody else's checks."

R. 108:194.

Admission of such evidence was therefore improper.
Officer Delao's testimony regarding stolen checkbooks was
prejudicial and requires a new trial.

As set forth in Point I,

supra at 11-16, the state did not present evidence from Tamara
Troester as to whether she had given Mr. Kocher permission to
drive the car.

Additionally, Mr. Kocher presented evidence

indicating that he intended to return the car.

Moreover,

Appellant presented evidence of justification or necessity--that
Terry Lewis was threatening Ms. Nelson and Appellant needed the
car to save her.

Rather than convicting Appellant of theft of a

motor vehicle as charged, the jury was convinced of at least some
of the defense evidence since it convicted Mr. Kocher on the
lesser charge of joyriding.
Under these circumstances, the outcome on Count I might well
have been more favorable to Appellant if the jury had not been
improperly informed that Mr. Kocher possessed stolen checks.
Instead, the jury likely assumed that Mr. Kocher was a bad person
based on this testimony and speculated as to whose checks they
were.

As defense counsel pointed out, the state referred to a

"stolen" vehicle during the trial; reference to "stolen" checks
20

might well have improperly convinced the jury that the car was
also stolen.

Given that the evidence did not establish that

Ms. Troester did not give Appellant permission to use the car, a
question as to Appellant's intent existed, and the threats from
Mr. Lewis provided a complete defense, the improper testimony
prejudiced Appellant.
The trial judge gave a cautionary instruction, specifically
referring to the evidence of stolen checks, immediately after the
testimony.

R. 108:167-68.

This cautionary instruction did not

undo the damage; indeed, it emphasized the evidence for the jury.
As defense counsel pointed when asked whether he would like an
additional instruction, "I don't think that we can unring the
bell."

R. 108:194-195.

While recognizing that curative instructions play an
important role in our criminal justice system, the lead opinion
in State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) also recognized that
curative instructions are not a "cure-all," and that "[s]ome
errors may be too prejudicial for curative instructions to
mitigate their effect, and a new trial may be the only proper
remedy."

Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273; see also id. at 278-79

(Durham, J. concurring)(expressing concern about the
effectiveness of and possible prejudice caused by curative
instructions).

The error in this case, informing the jury of

other crimes evidence, was too prejudicial to be mitigated by a
curative instruction.

Accordingly, Appellant respectfully

requests a new trial.
21

CONCLUSION
Appellant John Richard Kocher respectfully requests that
this Court reverse his convictions and remand this case for a new
trial.
SUBMITTED this 3di*.

day of April, 1999.

Ch^e.ulDy
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

KAREN STAM
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers,
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior consent — Accessory or accomplice.
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different person.
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Kule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evifcdence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
afatute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or w a s t e of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.)

ADDENDUM B
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1

THE COURT:

Would you do that and as you do that,

2

would you use the lectern and carefully kind of twist that

3

forward.

4

thread and we've broken it again.

Do you know, that wire is literally hanging by a

5
6

MS. BARTON:

Oh.

I'm sorry, your Honor, I

probably--

7

THE COURT:

That's okay, you need to move it,

8

swivel it, I wish it were on a little bit of a swivel, but

9

if it moves more than a couple inches, it doesn't have a lot

10

of variance and if it moves too far, then the wire rips out,

11

so you did just fine.

12

swivel and then it would--we wouldn't be breaking the wire

13

off, but you did just fine.

14
15

MR. MACK:

THE COURT:

17

MR. MACK:

19
20

He is — he's fixed that-He--you know, he's gotten you

everything else.
THE COURT:

He's been on his hands and knees--

(Inaudible)

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. MACK:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. MACK:

25

Well, isn't Weldon in charge of this

stuff?

16

18

I wish it actually had a built-in

That's right.
Okay.

Judge, are we on?

I think we're on.
The first thing is, we would make a

motion to dismiss for failure to establish one of the
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1 elements of theft as outlined in the Information.

It was,

2

as stated throughout the trial and even argued in closing,

3

that--that John Kocher obtained or exercised unauthorized

4

control over the operable motor vehicle of Tamera Troester

5 with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
6

We understand the State had a problem with--with

7 procuring her presence here during trial and put on Mr.
8 Troester who claimed to be co-owner of the car, who said
9 that he did not give permission to anyone to use the car.
10 He--I don't think there was any testimony one way or the
11

other whether he knew that his wife had given anyone

12 permission to use the car.
It was argued throughout that it was her car and

13
14

only in the reading of the instruction element--elements

15

instruction on theft, the Court changed it to Ken or Tamera.

16 And we--we object to that.

The State has to do that, we

17 would have opposed that if they had done that and our motion
18

is to dismiss that count based on that.
The next thing, your Honor, is our objection to

19
20

Instruction No. 22, which was the State's instruction-THE COURT:

21
22

I'm just--

23

MS. BARTON:

24

THE COURT:

25

I just want to stop here for a moment.

May I respond?
I want Ms. Stam--now, you know, when

you have co-counsel, you have to be on the same sheet of

ADDENDUM C
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1 || detailed search.

Actually I called for medical at the same

2 II time I was performing a detailed search of the suspect.
3

Q

4

defendant?

5

A

6

What did you do to conduct the search of the

Checked the waist line, checked pockets, checked

legging, just overall for--for weapons or contraband.

7

Q

Did you locate anything?

8I

A

I did.

9

Q

What did you locate?

10

A

In the pants pocket of the suspect, there were a

11

few things; there was a hypodermic needle--actually not in

12

his pocket, but the hypodermic needle was next to him.

13

-according to my report here, there's--there's two books of

14

stolen checks and a yellowish--

15

MS. STAM:

Your Honor, objection.

The-

The--if we

16

could have a motion outside the--the--there were no stolen

17

checks, that--he--the officer was instructed not to say

18

anything about stolen checks.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

I understand.

Okay.

At this

20

time, what I'm going to do is just--is order stricken the

21

statement referenced by this officer to any checks that may

22

have been stolen.

23

Members of the jury panel, that is not charged nor

24

relevant nor material in this case, and one of the functions

25

that I have is to insure that the--as the evidence gets past
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1

me to you, that it is both, is legally relevant and not

2

prejudicial.

3

Sometimes extrinsic things get said that really

4

aren't germane or pertinent to the charges before you and--

5

and reference to these other materials doesn't — isn't

6

legally relevant with respect to the charges before us

7

today, so I'm going to ask you to disregard any reference,

8

utterance made by this or any other witness to matters that

9

are not legally pertinent, specifically the last statement

10

made by this officer regarding some checks which were--may

11

or may not have been found and may or may not have been

12

stolen or whatever, that has no bearing whatsoever in this

13

case and you're just to disregard that utterance in its

14

entirety and I'll order it be stricken.

Okay?

15

Let's--

16

THE WITNESS:

17

THE COURT:

18

One thing that might be really helpful is, let's

Sorry, your Honor.

Understand.

Sorry, Ms. Stam.

Understand.

Okay.

19

see, why don't you re-state the question and let me just

20

say--add this parenthetically to the jury and assistance to

21

the officer here.

22

With respect to any report, you're entitled to do

23

one of two things.

One, you can either pause in ask--

24

answering a question, peruse your written report, use that

25

as a means of refreshing your recollection and then you can
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1
2

MS. STAM:

Your Honor, before we would put on any

evidence, we'd ask the Court for a brief recess, outside--or

3 brief time to have the record outside the presence of the
4
5

jury, if they could take a short break.
THE COURT:

Okay.

What we'll do then is, let's go

6 ahead and excuse the jury and we'll stay with counsel and
7 with the accused here and give you the benefit of the record
8
9
10

for whatever motions you want to make.
Okay.

Ms. Stam?

MS. STAM:

Your Honor, we'd like to make a motion

11

for mistrial.

Mr. Mack is going to argue that motion.

12

filed pretrial motions asking that--that other matters not

13

be included in evidence, we made a motion at the beginning

14

of Court today.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MACK:

Okay.

We

Mr. Mack?

Judge, if I could just--your Honor, as-

17

-as Karen stated, she had filed a motion in limine, we

18

expanded on that this morning.

19

about what things we were concerned about prohibiting the

20

mention of.

We--we were very specific

We talked about the checkbooks at the bench.

21 We had an agreement, we had a stipulation, we had an order,
22
23

as we understand it.
Then that, advertently or--or inadvertently was

24

elicited by the prosecutor from the State's witness.

25

not something we--we backed into accidentally, it came from

It's
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the State and the State's witness.
2

It — it's ordinarily probably not as big a deal,

3 but in this case, it's a very big deal, we feel, because it4

-it goes right to the heart of our defense and--and that is

5

that there is no intention, there was no intention to

6 permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle in this case.
7

The State, in—in opening, stated that the jury

8 would hear from Tamera Troester, the car owner, that certain
9 items of her had been taken from the car.

Presumably that

10 was mentioned because they hoped to bolster that theory of
11

intent to permanently deprive based on Mr. Kocher being in

12 possession of--of other stolen property from this car, and
13

if he's in possession of property that's out of her car,

14

then he probably meant to keep her car, too.
Well, as things unfolded, she—she's not here.

15
16

That evidence was not--didn't come from anybody.

17

evidence about him being in possession of anything from the

18

car.

19

No

Therefore, your Honor, it--it's extremely

20

prejudicial.

Even though you have given a curative

21

instruction to the jury, they have heard that he was in

22 possession of stolen property.

It--it didn't go beyond

23

that, they--you know, they're left to speculate, I guess, as

24

to whether it was her checks, the car owner's checks, or

25

somebody else's checks.

It doesn't matter, though, and I

1 II don't think that we can unring the bell that they--that
2

they've heard, that he was in possession of stolen property.

3

Throughout the trial, and I think it's been

4

objectionable that there's been reference made to stolen

5

car, stolen car.

6

about, proving that this car was stolen.

7

Well, that's--that's what this trial is

And--and however, you know, however innocent or--

8

or advertent-inadvertent it was, I--I think there's just

9

huge damage that's been caused by that statement.

And I--I

10

think that you'll--Ms. Barton has apologized to Ms. Stam

11

saying that she neglected, I believe, to inform her witness

12

that that was how we were proceeding and that's--you know,

13

I'm sorry if that's the case, but that's--that's too bad.

14

You know, the--the damage is done and--and she had an

15

obligation to inform her witness, all her witnesses about

16

those things that were not on the--on the table during this

17

trial.

18
19
20

And that hasn't happened.
And I think that the only recourse is a mistrial

at this point.
THE COURT:

Mr. Mack, the thing I'm not clear

21

about is the--I'm not buying on frankly the nexus between

22

him being--a statement that he's in possession of stolen

23

checks and how that necessarily leads to the notion that he

24

had the intent to steal the car.

25

That in fact--let me just say, it seems to me that
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1

it is, in my view, it's probably more compelling the other

2

way.

3

possession of a car for the purpose of taking the contents

4

out, I mean that--that may be why he took possession of the

5

car, not to steal the car, but to take the contents out.

6

The fact that he is in possession of something

That, in other words, if one--if a person were to take

7

thatf s stolen whether it' s out of the car or from some other

8

party, I don't know how that--how we get to there, to jump

9

the hurdle that that's any evidence of intent to deprive the

10
11

owner.
MR. MACK:

Well, because I don't think there is

12

any otherwise, Judge.

13

without him being in possession of anything stolen, other

14

than the car that they're saying is stolen--

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MACK:

I think otherwise the State is left

Right.
--there's nothing to suggest that he

17

wasn't ever going to return it or had plans to return it or-

18

-or anything of the like.

19

might or might not have been.

20

possession of a couple of stolen checkbooks--

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. MACK:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

They don't know whose checks they

Okay.

All they know is, he's in

Well, how does that make it--

--which makes him out to be a thief.
How does that make it more or less

likely that he was going to return the car?
MR. MACK:

Well, I don't know.

I think it makes
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1

it more likely that, in their minds that he wasn't 'cause

2

they'll think, well, here's a guy who has--he doesn't care

3

about other people's property, he doesn't care about these

4

people's checks that he's got, so why should we think he's

5

ever going to return this car?

6

come in here now and say, yeah, I was going to return the

7

car, that's what my intention was all along.

8

person.

9

Of course, he's going to

I'm an honest

Well, they--they now know that the officer says he

10

was in possession of stolen--other stolen property.

11

the "other stolen property" is the problem.

12

it matters who it belonged to, I don't think, you know,

13

obviously they don't know who it belonged to, but it just

14

changes his--his character, changes his posture completely.

15

I think

I don't think

If he--he takes the stand or--I--I anticipate that

16

he is going to, we've discussed that although we haven't

17

finally decided that, and says, I was going to return it--

18

honest I was going to return it, they're going to say, yeah,

19

sure you were, just like you were going to return those--

20

those checkbooks to people.

21

You know, it's just so improper and--and that's

22

why we brought that up specifically because it's a big

23

problem.*

24
25

THE COURT:

Okay.

understand your position.

Thank you, Mr. Mack.
Thank you, sir.

I
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Ms. Barton?
2

MS. BARTON:

Your Honor, let me say first of all

3

that I--the motion in limine, not to--not to sound flip, but

4

it was rather a laundry list of things, and not that that

5 excuses it--not that it excuses the mention of any of those
6 things, from my perspective that was my duty to inform my-7 my witness; however, I did admonish him as to the
8 defendant's felony status, I admonished him as to the
9 restricted person charge and I admonished him of several
10
11

other things.
I don't want the Court to think that this is in

12

any way Officer Delao's fault because it's not.

I did not

13

specifically mention to him the checkbooks; however, I

14

argue, your Honor, strenuously, that this is not overly

15 prejudicial and the Court has given a curative instruction
16

and there really, I don't believe, is any further prejudice

17 beyond that point.
18

The jury has been instructed not to consider it

19

and the--the question that was asked was not intention--was

20

not intended to invoke that response.

21

question, I asked what was recovered off of the defendant's

It was an open-ended

22 person, I did not ask about any stolen property.

It was an

23

inadvertent mistake.

The jury can see that and the fact

24

that no charge regarding stolen property appears on the

25

Information is on its face evidence to the jury that that
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1

was not prejudicial to the defendant, that apparently

2

nothing ever came of that.

3

consider that evidence.

4

They're not being asked to

And your Honor, this--there--there is no evidence

5

that the defendant was intending to return the vehicle in

6

this case and that' s what they need to show for the lesser

7

included; so for them to say that the State hasn't shown any

8

evidence of his intent to steal the vehicle, I think is--is

9

incorrect.

10
11

The issue is, was there any evidence of his

intent to return the vehicle, which there was none.
I--I don't feel that this has been prejudicial to

12

this case in any way that would cause error.

13

instruction, I think solves the problem and we should

14

proceed with the defense's case.

15

THE COURT:

16

Mr. Mack, anything else?

17

MR. MACK:

The curative

Thank you.

Well, Judge, I think the--the statement

18

about whether there's been any--whether we've shown any

19

evidence that he intended to return the car is--is--we're

20

not required to show anything at all, but we intend to

21

demonstrate some evidence.

22

evidence that he--that he--to indicate that he wasn't going

23

to--that he was going to keep the car or not going to return

24

the car, except now that they, you know, that the jury's

25

heard from one of their witnesses that this is a guy who has

They--they don't show any
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1 || other stolen property and so what are they going to think?
2 II Of course, they're going to think that, that he--here's a
3

guy with other stolen property, he's in a car that's not his

4

so yeah, he, you know, he's going to keep the car, he wasn't

5

going to return it.

6

It just guts our defense of the case.

And it was very important to us, that's why we

7

brought it up, that's why we were very specific about it,

8

and--and the fact that we may have had a laundry list

9

doesn't matter, it doesn't matter how long it was, it was

10

agreed to, it was ordered by this Court and--and it was an

11

oversight and now it's out and you know--and that's a

12 problem.
13

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

I'm going to deny

14

the motion for a mistrial.

I think that the--oh, I suppose

15

there's gradations of prejudice or harm in terms of the

16

error and based on the context of how it came in

17 particularly, I don't have any belief other than it was
18 wholly inadvertent and is not a matter of the State trying
19

to somehow shoe horn in something that otherwise could not

20

come in through the front door, get in the back door.

21

think this was absolutely through inadvertence.

22
23

I

You know, the truth of it is, we require on direct
examination non-leading questions and open-ended questions,

24 you can't necessarily control the response, that's why it's
25

a non-leading question, so the fact that something came in
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1

that shouldn't have come in is regrettable.

2

some way of turning the clock back and not having it, but I

3

don't. All I can do is make the curative instruction and in

4

my view, Mr. Mack and Ms. Stam, I think that the--that there

5

is no substantial residual damage or error to the--to the

6

detriment of the defendant.

7

I wish I had

Did--I will invite this and I guess there's really

8

some conflicting motivations, maybe, that--that--and I

9

understand if you don't want me to do anything more, I

10 won't; if you'd rather have an appellate court look at it in
11

the status that it is, I just want to offer to you if you

12 would like me to make any additional curative instructions
13

or amplify again in the--there is the one boilerplate

14

instruction that says you're not to consider evidence which

15

is ordered stricken out and that sort of thing.

16

If, in addition to that instruction, if you want

17 me to emphasize this particular faux paus again to the jury,
18

I will.

If in your judgment, you think it is better left

19

un-lack of attention called to it, I'll do whatever you

20

think is best, Mr. Mack or Ms. Stam, in order to minimize

21

the likelihood of any collateral consequence to your client.

22

Again, I don't believe there will be any.

I don't

23

think that--I think the jury can follow the instruction, I

24

think they'll disregard it.

I think that--I think they

25 will, I hope they will, I told them to do so and again I'm
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1 II not sure there's really been a direct inference that--that
2

cuts in favor of intent to deprive on the motor vehicle to

3

have these other collateral issues.

4

Are you interested in having me re-address or re-

5

state more emphatically or state a different way any

6

curative instruction with respect to this, Mr. Mack or Ms.

7

Stam, or would you rather I just leave it?

8

MR. MACK:

9

compounds the problem, that--

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. MACK:

12

Judge, I think we think that that

Okay.
--despite the suggestion that they

ignore something, especially the more you--

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MACK:

To continue to call---say ignore it, they won't, but they

15

can't ignore something they've heard anyway, so we don't

16

want you to say anymore.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

And I'll just

18

go ahead and leave it the way it is and leave it with the

19

boilerplate jury instruction that tells them again to

20

disregard any stricken out evidence and of course that falls

21

in this gamut.

22

I will not be making it specifically and your

23

objection is noted for the record.

I think it certainly is

24

very clearly stated, I appreciate and acknowledge your

25

position.

I think it's just a question of reasonable minds

ADDENDUM D

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971000535 FS

JOHN RICHARD KOCHER,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
July 23, 1998

Clerk:
christeh
Prosecutor: STEVE MERCER
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAREN STAM
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 28, 1969
Audio
Tape Number:
98170
Tape Count: 6727
CHARGES
1. UNLAW CONTROL OF VEHICLE/TRAILER (JOYRID (amended) - Class A
Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 04/30/1998 {Guilty - Jury}
2. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 3rd Degree Felony
3. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/30/1998 {Guilty - Jury}
4. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 04/30/1998 {Guilty - Jury}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW CONTROL OF
VEHICLE/TRAILER (JOYRID a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed on year in the
Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.

Page 1

Case No: 971000535
Date:
Jul 23, 1998
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
SENTENCES FOR EACH CHARGE TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH EACH OTHER BUT
CONSECUTIVELY TO CASE 971000782 FS.
Dated this 'Y^?

day of

Page 2 (last)

